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Anglo-American relations and the making and breaking of the 




Peter Lowe wrote numerous excellent books and articles on the Korean War during 
his long career. The Origins of the Korean War, in particular, ranks as one of the 
seminal works on this topic.1 In the main, though, he focused on Britain’s role and 
Anglo-American relations during the conflict and paid little attention to developments 
during the eleven months between the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement on 
27 July 1953 and the termination of the Korean phase of the 1954 Geneva 
Conference.2 In fact, very few historians of the Korean War have scrutinised this 
period and the few scholarly works that do go beyond the beginning of the ceasefire 
have generally focused on the implementation of the armistice on the ground in Korea 
and not on diplomatic relations.3 Nonetheless, tensions continued to simmer between 
Washington and London and the bonds that held together the so-called ‘special 
relationship’ were tested almost to breaking point, just as they had been during the 
numerous crises that erupted while the fighting raged in Korea. This much-
overlooked episode of unrest between the Western camp’s closest and most powerful 
allies will thus form the focus of this chapter.  
On the surface the disagreements between the United States and Britain 
stemmed from the terms of the Korean Armistice Agreement. This document only 
created a military cease-fire at the thirty-eighth parallel between the belligerents. The 
fundamental political issue of Korean unification was not settled. Instead, the US and 
Communist military negotiators at Panmunjom had only agreed to recommend that a 
political conference should be held within 90 days of the termination of hostilities. 
The date, location, agenda and membership of this conference was left undecided. 
While all of these issues produced strains, as will be demonstrated below, it was the 
composition question that proved most controversial in terms of Anglo-American 
relations. At the heart of this matter was whether neutral nations, specifically India, 
should be invited to the conference. 
After months of trying both at the UN and bilaterally, a solution to the 
composition question was found at the US, Soviet, British and French foreign 
ministers meeting in Berlin in February 1954. This agreement paved the way for the 
opening of the Korean phase of the Geneva Conference in late April. Very little 
scholarly attention has been lavished on these discussions and even less has been 
written on Anglo-American animosity during this stage of the conference.4 Central to 
this oversight is that the Korean debates produced no positive results, and that more 
eventful negotiations soon took place at Geneva on Indochina. Historians have thus 
concentrated on this later phase of the conference since the decisions taken here are 
usually seen as integral to the outbreak of the Vietnam War over a decade later. The 
rifts between the US and British delegations were also clearer to see during these 
debates. Still, serious problems had already been encountered between the two allies 
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during the Korean talks since they disagreed on what course to pursue to bring these 
proceedings to a timely end. 
Invariably, when push came to shove the British government made the major 
concessions over the composition question and the handling of the talks at Geneva. 
Britain may have still been a global player in 1953-4 but its influence was rapidly 
fading and it had accepted a role as junior partner to the United States in the Western 
alliance. Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, 
moreover, recognized that they had to compromise if they hoped to maintain the 
special relationship. President Dwight Eisenhower, in contrast, was at the peak of his 
powers at this time since he had ended the deeply unpopular Korean War just six 
months after being elected. But to say that Washington got everything its own way 
during this period would be to ignore the efforts it made to appease its closest friend 
while not upsetting its newest ally, the Republic of Korea (ROK). 
Two central issues lay at the root of the fissures that formed in the special 
relationship during these months. To start with, Washington and London both had 
other international loyalties that pulled them in opposite directions on the Korean 
issue. For its part, the US government felt it had to work closely with the ROK after 
having spent three years of fighting alongside it, incurring great losses in manpower 
and resources, in order to maintain its existence. The Eisenhower administration, 
therefore, believed it could not ride roughshod over the wishes of ROK President 
Syngman Rhee even when he adopted a hard-line approach demanding Korean 
unification on his terms. The Churchill government, however, greatly disliked Rhee, 
who was considered to be undemocratic and manipulative. The British were also 
much less interested in Korea which it considered a peripheral matter that only 
distracted attention away from more important Cold War theatres. In consequence, 
London was much more interested in cooperating with its Commonwealth partners, 
particularly India whose friendship the British desired for strategic reasons and as a 
means of maintaining Third World goodwill. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal 
Nehru, however, was the one international statesman determined to find a 
compromise solution to the Korean problem, much to Washington and Seoul’s ire.   
Even more significantly, since Stalin’s death in March 1953, British and 
American Cold War strategies had been slowly diverging. For Churchill, the 
subsequent ‘peace offensive’ launched by the Soviet collective leadership had opened 
an opportunity to establish some form of détente with Moscow and he had made 
attaining this his final crusade in international affairs. Ultimately, the British Prime 
Minister desired a three-power summit composed of the United States, the Soviet 
Union and Britain to resolve all outstanding problems and saw the holding of a 
political conference on Korea as a small step towards achieving this goal.5 In 
addition, London had long been convinced that it was foolish to treat the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) as a pariah state, especially given Hong Kong’s precarious 
position. Rather, the British government believed that now the Korean War was over 
the PRC should be brought into the community of nations; China would then gravitate 
away from the Soviet bloc. But the Eisenhower administration did not share 
Churchill’s convictions and doubted the sincerity of the new Soviet leadership’s 
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overtures. US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, specifically, had little desire to 
negotiate with the USSR and even less with the PRC which Washington continued 
not to recognize and considered an aggressor since its intervention in Korea.6 
 
 
Round One: The UN and the Membership Question 
 
With the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement a special session of the UN 
General Assembly was scheduled to open on 17 August 1953. All parties expected 
that this forum would take up the Korean political conference issue. However, to 
complicate matters, in the brief interim period the Eisenhower administration tied 
itself firmly to the ROK. Dulles and the US Ambassador to the UN, Henry Cabot 
Lodge, travelled to Seoul almost immediately after the fighting stopped to conclude 
the US-ROK mutual security treaty that had been promised to Rhee a month earlier in 
order to convince him to accept the armistice. This pact thus made South Korea 
Washington’s newest ally and bound America’s international prestige to the 
continued existence of the ROK.  
With Dulles and Lodge away, discussions between the US and British 
delegations at the UN on the Korean political conference got underway only days 
before the special session opened. Lodge met with the British Minister of State, 
Selwyn Lloyd, who was present in New York because Eden was incapacitated with a 
serious bile-duct problem, and duly outlined a draft resolution that had been written 
on the flight back from Korea. This proposal recommended a two-sided conference 
with the ‘UN’ side composed of the member states which had contributed forces and 
the ROK. The Communist ‘aggressors’ should then name their own side. The 
proposal also stated that the conference should take place at a time and place to be 
arranged in discussions between the US government, acting on behalf of the UN, and 
the Communist side.  
On hearing this proposal, Lloyd argued that the conference should be round-
table in nature and include interested non-belligerents, particularly the Soviet Union 
and India. Lloyd also revealed that Britain had already promised a seat to India and 
stressed that the Commonwealth countries all felt that such a conference would be 
more acceptable to the Communists and stood a much better chance of success than 
resurrecting the tense cross-table talks at Panmunjom.7 Dulles, though, instructed 
Lodge to refuse membership to neutral countries and only to accept Soviet 
participation as part of the Communist side.8 At a meeting of the sixteen contributing 
states, therefore, the US delegation presented its draft resolution and all of these 
states, except South Africa which claimed it no longer had any interest in Korea now 
the fighting was over, agreed to co-sponsor it. Even Britain, in spite of its misgivings, 
acted as a sponsor in the interests of maintaining Western unity.9  
Yet relations between the United States and Britain soon began to deteriorate 
over the issue of Soviet participation. Acting Foreign Secretary Lord Salisbury, who 
was temporarily in charge of British foreign policy with Churchill having recently 
suffered a stroke, insisted on a separate draft resolution inviting the Soviet Union as 
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an interested party. Salisbury argued convincingly that if it was left to the Communist 
side to invite Moscow this would imply that the USSR was an aggressor.10 In 
response, Dulles argued that the American public would not tolerate Soviet 
participation.11 With tensions mounting, the inexperienced Salisbury simply 
instructed Lloyd to accept any procedure acceptable to Washington that would bring 
about Soviet membership.12 This action, however, proved premature since Dulles 
eventually grudgingly accepted the need to invite the Soviet Union if the conference 
was to stand any chance of success.13  
Problems over Soviet membership paled into insignificance compared to those 
produced concerning India’s membership. Salisbury had already instructed the British 
delegation to sponsor a draft resolution inviting India to participate at the 
conference.14 Importantly, all of the other Commonwealth members had also agreed 
to sponsor this proposal. They argued that India had played a key role in finding a 
solution to the prisoners-of-war problem, helping to bring the Korean conflict to an 
end, and was directly interested in a peaceful settlement as chairman of the Neutral 
Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC). The NNRC was the body created by the 
armistice agreement to take custody of prisoners who refused to return home after the 
fighting stopped until a solution to this problem was found at the political conference. 
The Eisenhower administration, however, refused to accept Indian membership since 
it did not want Nehru hijacking the conference and advocating concessions in order to 
appease the Communists. Evidently, the US government had become exasperated 
with what it perceived as India’s meddling in Korean affairs during the years of 
fighting. Furthermore, Washington was sensitive to views of the ROK government 
that claimed it would not attend the conference if India was present. Rhee argued that 
India had no right to interfere in Korean affairs and that Nehru was sympathetic to the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). For the Americans it was essential 
to have the ROK on-board or else the conference would be pointless.15 
To try to nip this problem in the bud, Lodge decided to bypass the British and 
approached directly V. K. Krishna Menon, Nehru’s special representative at the UN. 
Lodge told Menon that while his government had the ‘greatest respect and 
admiration’ for India, its participation at the conference would cause ‘great 
embarrassment’ between the United States and the ROK. The US delegation hoped, 
instead, that India would announce it would not pursue a place at the conference. In 
response, Menon cryptically stated that it would only participate if requested by both 
sides but stressed that India had a right to be present at the conference since it had 
contributed a field hospital unit to the UN action in Korea.16 To further confuse 
matters, Menon then told Lloyd that India definitely did wish to participate and 
criticized the US draft resolution for inviting only belligerents.17 
The special session of the General Assembly thus got underway with the US 
and British positions poles apart. These differences were soon made public in the First 
Committee. While Lodge argued against the participation of non-belligerents, Lloyd 
argued that the General Assembly had the authority to recommend the membership of 
any nation, including India.18 Gauging the response of the other member states, the 
Eisenhower administration became increasingly concerned that the Commonwealth 
5 
 
draft resolution inviting India would win widespread support. Accordingly, Dulles 
instructed Lodge to make it abundantly clear to the British delegation that the US 
government would vote against Indian participation.19 Nevertheless, in talks in 
Washington Salisbury told the US secretary of state that the British government had 
made a firm commitment to India.20 Even so, privately Salisbury was becoming 
increasingly concerned at the damage being done to Anglo-American relations. 
Consequently, he instructed the British delegation not to canvass other members to 
support the Commonwealth draft resolution.21  
By the end of the first week of the special session an open split between the 
United States and Britain on Indian participation seemed inevitable. But at the 
eleventh hour Menon intervened, thus preventing this from happening. He told Lloyd 
that while he was practically certain that the Commonwealth draft resolution would 
obtain a simple majority of votes, he doubted it would receive the two-thirds majority 
necessary to be formally adopted. He revealed that in these circumstances India would 
withdraw its candidacy.22 Menon stated in the General Assembly, moreover, that 
India would not seek a place at the conference unless it was clear that all the major 
parties desired its presence. Seizing on this point, Lodge publicly announced that the 
US government opposed Indian membership on the grounds that its presence would 
prevent the ROK from attending the conference.23 Following these developments, 
Salisbury decided that if the Commonwealth draft resolution did not receive 
overwhelming support Britain would seek the agreement of the other Commonwealth 
co-sponsors to withdraw their proposal.24  
After ten days of deliberation, therefore, the debate in the First Committee 
concluded in chaotic scenes. At the last minute, the Soviet delegation introduced a 
number of amendments to the various draft resolutions. After each of these 
amendments was decisively rejected, the fifteen-power draft resolution was voted 
upon and was overwhelmingly approved. Next, the draft resolution recommending 
Soviet participation was approved with almost all members voting for it. The 
Commonwealth draft resolution proposing Indian membership was then approved 
narrowly by twenty-seven votes to twenty-one, with eleven abstentions. Significantly, 
Britain and all of its Commonwealth partners supported this proposal but the United 
States voted against it. This represented the first time such a split had occurred at the 
UN over Korea. Finally, a Soviet draft resolution proposing the establishment of a 
round table conference composed of the two Koreas plus the Soviet Union, China, the 
United States, Britain, France, Czechoslovakia, Poland, India and Burma, was 
rejected, with the United States and Britain united against it.25 
The Commonwealth delegations met straight after this voting had taken place. 
Lloyd and the other Commonwealth representatives pressed Menon to withdraw 
India’s candidacy now it was clear that their draft resolution would not gain the 
necessary two-thirds majority to be formally adopted by the General Assembly. The 
Indian representative grudgingly accepted this course and the four co-sponsors agreed 
that their proposal should not be put to the vote.26 This plan was put into action the 
following day with Menon announcing that India ‘declined to participate’ in the 
conference. The New Zealand delegation then called for the Commonwealth draft 
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resolution not to proceed to the vote. On 28 August 1953 General Assembly 
Resolution 711 (VII) was thus adopted inviting the ‘UN’ side and the USSR to 
participate, as well as asking the Communist belligerents to name their side.27  
The US and British positions had been publicly aligned during the talks but 
privately neither government was entirely happy with the outcome of the special 
session. Washington had gotten its way on the question of Indian membership but, 
partly in response to British pressure, had unenthusiastically accepted the need to 
invite the Soviet Union to the conference. The Churchill government was even more 
disappointed since it had been forced to concede, against its better judgment, on the 
matter of Indian participation to avoid an open split with the United States. British 
resentment was then amplified when, as predicted, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai 
rejected General Assembly Resolution 711 (VII) on the grounds that neutrals should 
be present at the conference. India saw this as an opportunity to revive the 
composition question at the General Assembly when it met again a few weeks later. 
But the British government, reluctant to open old wounds, accepted the American 
argument that the UN should stick by its decision and not be held to ransom by the 




Round Two: Panmunjom and the Membership Question 
 
With the Korean debate at the UN postponed, Dulles sought to start bilateral 
negotiations between the United States and the PRC to resolve the composition 
question. To achieve this end he utilized the provision in General Assembly 
Resolution 711 (VII) permitting the US government to discuss the time and place of 
the conference with the Communist side. Dulles thus transmitted a communication to 
Beijing suggesting a meeting of emissaries at Panmunjom. Somewhat surprisingly 
after his negative response only weeks earlier, Zhou Enlai accepted this proposal and 
a meeting was set for 26 October 1953.29 For this task Dulles appointed Arthur Dean, 
a trusted former colleague from the Sullivan and Cromwell international law firm.30  
The talks between Dean and his Chinese counterpart, Huang Hua, however, 
were doomed from the outset. The Communist representative refused to discuss 
technical details such as the date and location of the conference until the presence of 
neutral countries at the conference was accepted.31 Dean, in contrast, was under strict 
instructions not to discuss the composition question until the date and location had 
been agreed.32 As a result, these meetings quickly descended into bitter slanging 
matches as each side accused the other of trying to sabotage the conference. But, even 
though a breakthrough was very unlikely, Dulles insisted that the talks be dragged out 
to head off debate at the UN.33 In the meantime, he instructed Lodge to move to 
adjourn the General Assembly for an indefinite period on the grounds that the Korean 
question was under active discussion at Panmunjom.34 The Indian delegation, 
however, insisted that a date be set to reconvene the General Assembly to discuss the 
work of the NNRC before it disbanded on 22 February 1954.35  
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For that reason, Eden – who had recently returned to active duty and assumed 
responsibility for foreign affairs with Churchill, now 78, frail after his stroke – was 
placed in a difficult position. He agreed with the Americans that the UN debate 
should be postponed so as not to interfere with Dean’s efforts, but he was also 
sympathetic to India’s desire to report on its difficult task as chairman of the NNRC. 
To bridge these divergent views Eden sought to persuade Lodge to amend his draft 
resolution so that a special session of the General Assembly could be called if the 
Panmunjom talks broke down.36 Yet Lodge refused to budge suspecting that India 
wished to reopen the composition question.37 Given the strength of Washington’s 
convictions and since this was a point of procedure rather than substance, Eden 
instructed the British delegation to support the US proposal.38 General Assembly 
Resolution 716 (VIII) was thus adopted on 8 December 1953 indefinitely recessing 
the UN debate. 39 
That same day Dean made a final effort to find a breakthrough on the 
composition question at Panmunjom. He conceded that some non-belligerent nations 
should be allowed to ‘participate’ at the conference but not be permitted to introduce 
items or vote. But Huang Hua dismissed this proposal as ‘absurd, ridiculous and stale’ 
and left the text received from Dean lying on the table at the end of the meeting.40 
Dean wished to break off the talks at this point but in light of the decision to recess 
the Korean debate at the General Assembly, Dulles instructed him to prolong the talks 
until 12 December 1953 to avoid controversy.41 At a meeting that day, therefore, 
Dean unilaterally recessed the negotiations on the pretext that Huang Hua had 
charged the United States with perfidy.42  
 
 
Round Three: The 1954 Berlin Conference and the Membership Question 
 
With the prospect of finding a solution to the membership question at Panmunjom all 
but dead the Eisenhower administration became convinced that the Korean political 
conference could only be established through bilateral negotiations with the Soviet 
Union. The president, in consequence, agreed with Churchill and French Premier 
Joseph Laniel, when they met at Bermuda in December 1953, to accept Moscow’s 
suggestion that the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain 
and France meet in Berlin in January 1954.43 This conference was called ostensibly to 
discuss the German and Austrian questions. But it was evident to all concerned that 
matters would quickly turn to more pressing Asian issues – namely the Korean 
political conference and the conflict in Indochina in which the Viet Minh, with 
increased Chinese support since the end of the Korean War, had gained the upper 
hand over the French colonial forces.  
Nonetheless, before the Berlin Conference got underway Menon again called 
for the General Assembly to be reconvened. He argued that with the Korean political 
conference nowhere in sight the UN members had to discuss the fate of the remaining 
non-repatriate prisoners held by the NNRC before 23 January 1954 when the custody 
period specified in the Korean Armistice Agreement expired. The British delegation 
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at the UN believed that this demand was reasonable given the collapse of the 
negotiations at Panmunjom.44 Yet Dulles opposed the Indian proposal, fearing 
renewed debate on the composition question that would interfere with the upcoming 
talks at Berlin.45 He thus sought to stymie Menon’s campaign by instructing Kenneth 
Young, Dean’s deputy at Panmunjom, to attempt to resume talks on the condition that 
the Communists retracted their charge of perfidy.46   
However, the NNRC’s decision to simply return the remaining non-repatriate 
prisoners of war to their former captors at the end of the custody period ended any 
possibility that the General Assembly would be reconvened at this time. Dulles now 
argued that since the NNRC had failed to complete its task, the UN was under no 
obligation to meet to hear its report.47 Crucially, this argument resonated with Eden 
and the vast majority of other UN member states who opposed India’s calls to 
reconvene the General Assembly. At the same time, after a number of weeks of 
trying, Young concluded that the Chinese delegation at Panmunjom had no interest in 
negotiating on the composition question.48  
The Berlin conference became, consequently, the only remaining venue in 
which to discuss the Korean political conference. Talks commenced on 25 January 
1954 between Dulles, Eden, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov and French 
Foreign Minister Georges Bidault and, as predicted, immediately shifted away from 
the German and Austrian questions. The first item on the agenda tabled by Molotov 
was a proposal for a five-power conference consisting of the four countries present 
plus the PRC to tackle all outstanding Asian issues.49 Dulles refused to accept this 
proposal on the grounds that the US government did not recognize the PRC. He also 
opposed discussing any other Asian issues until the Korean question had been 
resolved.50 Eden and Bidault were more sympathetic to the Soviet proposal. The 
French foreign minister was unwilling to rule out a five-power conference since his 
government was desperate to start talks over Indochina given its desperate military 
situation there. Eden, moreover, felt that it would be difficult to publicly defend 
refusing a five-power conference now that talks were being held neither at the UN nor 
Panmunjom.51 In addition, Churchill believed that it would be ‘wise’ to accept the 
Soviet proposal if this presented an opening for wider talks to lessen Cold War 
tensions.52  
While the Western foreign ministers presented a united front in the meetings 
with Molotov, behind-the-scenes bickering between Dulles, Eden and Bidault 
intensified. Importantly, though, Dulles was determined to get the Korean political 
conference underway with domestic and international pressure building. He proposed 
a conference on Korea, therefore, which would be sponsored by the Big Four who 
would then invite the ROK, the other contributing UN member states, the PRC and 
the DPRK. If before the adjournment of this conference developments indicated 
positive results the four inviting powers would consult on steps to establish a 
conference to restore peace in Indochina. The US proposal also included clauses 
stating that the conference was in line with General Assembly Resolution 711 (VII) 
and that the holding of the conference did not imply diplomatic recognition of the 
Beijing and Pyongyang regimes.53  
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Bidault was generally in favour of this proposal, although he also wanted a 
clearly indication that a conference on Indochina would definitely take place. Eden 
also saw the benefits of the proposal since it would get the United States, the Soviet 
Union and the PRC sitting at the same table. But the British foreign secretary was 
convinced that Molotov would reject the proposal given the references to recognition 
of the PRC and the General Assembly resolution.54 He thus took the lead in redrafting 
the proposal effectively removing the comments Molotov found objectionable. 
Luckily, while Dulles was uncomfortable with some of these concessions, he accepted 
them since the key principles remained.55 As a result, after lengthy and often 
rancorous debate, the four foreign ministers agreed that a meeting of their nations 
would take place at Geneva on 26 April 1954 to resolve the Korean question. The 
United States would invite the ROK and the other UN contributing states while the 
Soviet Union would invite the PRC and the DPRK. If the discussions on Korea made 
satisfactory progress then a separate but contemporaneous conference on Indochina 
could be established, with its composition to be decided at the time.56  
Anglo-American relations had been tested at the Berlin conference. At the 
heart of the problems experienced was Britain’s desire to engage with the Communist 
powers and settle the Korean question to kick-start the process toward détente. If this 
involved Western recognition of the PRC then this was a concession London was 
willing to make since it had already done this in early 1950. The Eisenhower 
administration, conversely, remained wary of engaging with the Soviet bloc and was 
under no circumstances going to recognize the government of a country it had 
recently been fighting against. Friction at Berlin was also partly a response to the poor 
relations that existed between Eden and Dulles. The two men had quarrelled over a 
number of issues in the past and Eden had even advised Eisenhower not to appoint 
Dulles as his secretary of state in November 1952. Additionally, the Englishman’s 




The Korean phase of the 1954 Geneva Conference 
 
Despite the agreements reached at Berlin, the two-and-a-half month period before the 
opening of the 1954 Geneva conference was full of controversy. The Eisenhower 
administration’s priority was convincing the reluctant ROK government to 
participate. On his part, Rhee demanded vast amounts of military assistance from 
Washington before finally agreeing to attend just eight days before the conference 
was due to begin. The Western sponsors also ran into many difficulties with Moscow 
in regard to the technical arrangements for the conference. The three Western 
governments argued that the conference should take place in the UN’s Palais des 
Nations and be serviced by UN Secretariat personnel, since this was the only practical 
solution and would maintain the world organization’s link with the Korean question. 
The Soviet leadership, however, opposed any UN role until only a few weeks before 
the conference was due to start when they accepted there was no practical alternative. 
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In addition, Anglo-American friction flared up over the seating arrangements at the 
conference. The Eisenhower administration remained adamant that it would only 
accept a two-sided conference. But the British government argued that a round-table 
conference would be more conducive to compromise. Yet with the conference about 
to start Eden conceded to prevent a major crisis occurring. A horse-shoe seating 
arrangement, with the delegations seated in alphabetical order, was thus agreed with 
the Soviet Union.57 
More significantly, planning for the Geneva Conference was greatly 
complicated by events in Indochina. On 12 March 1954 the Viet Minh launched a 
final assault on the French military’s stronghold at Dien Bien Phu sparking a major 
crisis within the Western alliance. The US government, now funding 80 per cent of 
France’s military effort, seriously contemplated direct intervention in the conflict and 
even the use of atomic weapons. But in the end Washington decided to supply the 
French only with additional aircraft and pilots. Central to this decision was the British 
reaction. The Eisenhower administration was only willing to deploy US troops to 
Indochina as part of a coalition with the British. The Churchill government, however, 
was convinced that the French would be defeated and that the best course was to find 
an acceptable political solution at the negotiating table. 
Ominously, the Korean phase of the Geneva conference got underway at the 
height of this crisis. Hence from the outset it was clear that all the non-Korean 
participants shared the view that Indochina was now the much more important 
international crisis and should be dealt with straightaway. In addition, the majority of 
the delegations present agreed that a balance of power now existed in Korea, the 
resumption of hostilities was unlikely, and the peninsula could be allowed to remain 
divided since a solution acceptable to all would be impossible to attain. As a result, 
neither side was willing to make any concessions which risked its position on the 
peninsula. Nevertheless, in accordance with the Berlin agreements, the Korean phase 
of the conference had to be dealt with before Indochina could be discussed. The 
question that plagued the US and British delegations in Geneva, therefore, was how to 
terminate the talks on Korea as expeditiously as possible. 
The first act of the conference was to appoint Eden, Molotov and Prince Wan 
Waithayakon, the foreign minister of Thailand, as its joint chairmen.58 While the 
chairmanship was a strictly administrative position, Eden believed that his 
appointment placed him in a position of responsibility for the fate of the conference. 
For that reason he felt that the conference had to be treated as a genuine attempt to 
find a solution to the Korean question even if he had little faith that the unification of 
the peninsula could be achieved. Eden also desired real dialogue with the Communist 
side, especially with the Chinese whom he hoped to entice back into international 
society and away from the USSR. To achieve these ends Eden proposed that the UN 
side put forward a moderate proposal from the start in order to win over international 
opinion. If, as expected, the Communists rejected this position the Korean talks could 
be terminated without any harm being done to the Western alliance. Attention could 
then shift to the Indochina question. Importantly, this strategy garnered widespread 
support, particularly from Britain’s Commonwealth partners. 
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Dulles agreed with Eden that the likelihood of finding a breakthrough on 
Korea was minimal and made this clear by declaring he would only attend the first 
week of the conference, during which he controversially refused to shake hands with 
Zhou Enlai.59 But, despite these views, Dulles wanted to drag out the conference for 
two reasons. First, he believed that the longer the Communists were exposed to 
international scrutiny the more they would demonstrate their intransigence. This 
would allow the UN side to break off the negotiations while winning a propaganda 
victory. Furthermore, Washington needed time to coordinate its policy with the ROK 
government. This process had begun long before the conference opened since the US 
government appreciated that South Korea had the most at stake. Yet the Eisenhower 
administration feared that if Seoul adopted an aggressive independent policy at the 
conference this would highlight the divisions within the Western alliance and permit 
the Communists to end the talks in an advantageous position.60 Accordingly, the US 
ambassador to the ROK, Ellis Briggs, and Dulles’ special envoy Arthur Dean, 
pressured Rhee to temper his views. At the same time, the US delegation worked 
more closely with its South Korean counterpart, led by Foreign Minister Pyun Yung-
tai, than with any other delegation at the conference. 
Still, when the plenary sessions on Korea commenced Pyun called for the 
Chinese ‘aggressors’ to withdraw from Korea and for UN-observed elections to take 
place solely in North Korea to fill the 100 seats left open in the ROK National 
Assembly. In retaliation, the North Korean representative, Nam-Il, demanded that all 
foreign forces be withdrawn within six months and that all-Korea elections be 
arranged by an equal North-South committee in order to establish a new fully 
representative government.61 In the debates that followed, the Soviet and Chinese 
delegations backed Nam Il’s proposal while the Americans supported Pyun’s 
suggestion. Significantly though, very few of the other UN contributing states, 
including Britain, became involved in the debate. This silence infuriated Dulles who, 
shortly before leaving Geneva, strongly complained to Eden that the British 
delegation had not spoken to defend the US position despite the attacks being made 
by the Communist representatives. He claimed this presented, ‘a pathetic spectacle of 
drifting without any agreed policy or purpose’. In response, Eden explained that 
Britain and the other Commonwealth delegations had not spoken in the debate since 
they did not want to get tied to the ROK formula which they opposed.62 
And so by the end of the first week of the conference the UN side was 
thoroughly divided. The new head of the US delegation, Under-Secretary of State 
Walter Bedell Smith, nonetheless, was determined to find a means to bring the 
Korean phase of the conference to a close in a way acceptable to both Britain and the 
ROK. The impetus for this drive was the news on 8 May 1954 that Dien Bien Phu had 
fallen to the Viet Minh. As a result, the Indochina phase of the conference 
commenced and Washington now wished to focus its attention on this matter. The 
Eisenhower administration was also concerned that the united Communist side was so 
far winning the psychological battle.  Smith thus called for the UN side to formulate a 
set of general unification ‘principles’ that would uphold the UN’s authority to answer 
the Korean question. He thought this could best be achieved by calling for the world 
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organization to supervise all-Korea elections. Smith had no apprehensions that the 
Communists would accept this proposal since they had consistently refuted the UN’s 
right to interfere in Korea’s future. But he hoped both the British and South Koreans 
might accept this proposal as a way to means to terminate the talks.63  
Significantly, the US government discussed this proposal with the ROK in 
Seoul and Geneva before it approached the British. Rhee and Pyun, however, 
continued to argue against all-Korean elections and to demand China’s immediate 
withdrawal. After almost a fortnight of fruitless discussions, Smith then sought to 
coordinate policy with the United States’ other allies, starting with the British. Eden 
welcomed the idea of all-Korea elections but was less certain over the principle of UN 
supervision. He argued that if the Communist side was willing to accept some form of 
international supervision then the British government would find it difficult to justify 
terminating the talks on the UN principle. Furthermore, Eden argued that the talks 
should not be terminated without any prospect of resurrecting them in the future. 
Working closely with Menon, who was present in Geneva even though India was not 
a participant, Eden therefore suggested that a statement be issued highlighting the 
‘points of agreement’ with the Communists. However, the US delegation dismissed 
this proposal out of hand since it did not want to commit to another round of 
negotiations given the lack of progress at Geneva.64  
Meanwhile, at a meeting of the sixteen allied delegations Pyun had 
unexpectedly presented a fourteen-point unification plan that essentially embodied 
Smith’s principles.65 The reasons behind the ROK’s volte face are unclear, although it 
is probable that Rhee finally accepted the US argument that the Communists would 
reject these principles, thus allowing the Korean discussions to be terminated. 
Evidently, the South Korean president preferred no unification plan over one that 
might jeopardize the ROK’s and his own future. In addition, Rhee knew that he could 
only push Washington so far since his country relied on American support and 
goodwill.   
In this climate, Eden also now accepted the US proposal in the interest of 
Anglo-American relations, stating that the principle of UN supervision was 
defensible, and because he agreed that the Indochina phase was now the priority.66 
Consequently, all of the sixteen Allied delegations, including the British and South 
Koreans, worked in harmony to draft a declaration terminating the conference if the 
Communists rejected the principle of UN supervision.67 This plan was put into action 
on 15 June 1954 when the Communist side refused to accept the UN’s authority in 
this matter, claiming that the world organization was a belligerent in the conflict and 
had no right to interfere in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state. The Korean phase 
of the conference thus ended without any decisions being taken on the fate of the 
peninsula.68 
The US delegation had achieved its difficult task of holding together its 
disparate allies in Geneva. The divisions within the UN side, however, had not been 
kept private. Smith’s claims on his return to Washington that allied unity had been 
maintained throughout the conference thus sounded false.69 The US under-secretary 
of state was far more truthful in his telegram to the Department of State a week earlier 
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when he wrote of relations with the other members of the UN side, ‘it was like 
herding a flock of rabbits through a hole in a fence, and there was cause for extreme 
exasperation’.70 Clearly, Washington’s and London’s differing loyalties and 
conceptions of the Cold War had come to the fore at Geneva creating friction between 
the two Western allies. But in the end the US delegation, due in large part to Smith’s 
patience and skill, was able to force Britain and the ROK to toe the line. Even so, the 
US delegation did make a number of concessions to appease Eden and his 






The eleven months following the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement 
represented a dangerous period in the Cold War. The prospect of fighting in Korea 
resuming loomed large while the situation in Indochina threatened to create another 
‘hot’ conflict on the Asian mainland. Additionally, with Stalin’s death and 
Eisenhower’s election much uncertainty existed. Some, such as Churchill, hoped that 
tensions between the two blocs could be lifted but others, most notably Dulles, were 
seeking ways to put pressure on Moscow. For these reasons it is understandable why 
the crisis in Anglo-American relations regarding the post-war political conference on 
Korea has been largely ignored by historians. Yet the level of tension created between 
the United States and Britain surrounding this issue was palpable.  
On the membership question, Washington and London came extremely close 
to splitting at the UN over India’s right to participate demonstrating that the two 
capitals had differing alternative alliance loyalties. But Britain did eventually 
concede, prioritising Anglo-American relations over Commonwealth allegiances. 
Then again at the Berlin conference Dulles and Eden clashed repeatedly over the 
Soviet proposal for a five-power conference, including the PRC, to resolve all 
outstanding Asian issues. Here the United States’ and Britain’s opposing conceptions 
on establishing dialogue with the Communist states proved troublesome. Yet Dulles 
and Eden were willing to compromise paving the way for the agreement to hold the 
Geneva conference. Rifts between the US and British delegations during the Korean 
phase of this conference, however, were quick to appear. The Eisenhower 
administration, eager to work closely with the ROK government and with no interest 
in appeasing the Communists, wished to take a hard line. In stark contrast, the 
Churchill government, with the support of its Commonwealth partners, wished to put 
forward a proposal that at least appeared to be a genuine attempt to bring about 
Korean unification. Nonetheless, events in Indochina made terminating the Korean 
negotiations everyone’s priority.  Eden thus accepted the Smith’s principle of UN 
supervision of all-Korea elections before any lasting harm was done to the special 
relationship. 
The Korean phase of the 1954 Geneva conference marked the final time the 
international community seriously attempted to find a solution to the Korean 
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unification question. Nevertheless, for two decades after Geneva the Korean item 
continued to be debated at the UN. But discussions invariably descended into a 
propaganda contest over whether the DPRK should be invited to participate. 
Evidently, the two Koreas and their superpower patrons were satisfied with the status 
quo for the time being. Importantly for Anglo-American relations Britain happily 
followed America’s lead at the UN. After the problems encountered between the two 
states over the making and breaking of the Korean phase of the Geneva conference, 
neither Washington nor London wished to revisit this issue. For the British 
government Korea was no longer a problem over which it was worth risking the 
special relationship. For the US administration Korea had become its responsibility 
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